THE JUST-DO-IT DECISION: SCHOOL-FUNDING
LITIGATION TESTS THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
One of the most contentious debates raging in public education
in the past quarter century has centered on the government's schoolfunding obligation and the role that money plays in assuring delivery
of a quality education.' The question, in simple terms, is "Does
Money Matter?" 2 The lines are sharply drawn.' State education officials and lawmakers contend that increasing funding does not guarantee a quality education. Urban school boards and advocates for
I See Richard J. Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on 'Does Money Matter?," 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 457, 458 (1991)

(contending that focusing purely on funding
fails to recognize academic and societal factors that impact on educational quality).
The author notes that school districts must devise strong educational plans to raise
student achievement before additional money can be put to effective use. See id. at
462-63; see also Peter Passell, Money Doesn't Buy Test Scores, Studies Say, N.Y. TiMEs, May
28, 1997, at B7 (reviewing research suggesting that, absent specific programs aimed
at improving student achievement in academic subjects, increased school funding
will be absorbed into general school district budgets rather than reaching the classroom and impacting student performance).
2 See Ronald F. Ferguson, Payingfor Public Education: New Evidence on How
and
Why Money Matters, 28 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 465, 465 (1991). The author analyzed data
from 900 school districts throughout Texas and found an exceptionally strong correlation between teacher quality and high student performance. See id. at 465-66.
Ferguson suggests that providing poorer districts with additional funding to attract
the highest quality teachers would substantially enhance the performance of students in those challenged districts. See id. at 466-67. Furthermore, Ferguson contends, "Since more and better teachers can help to raise standardized test scores
and higher salaries attract more and better teachers, money matters for raising test
scores." Id. at 489.
3 CompareFerguson, supra note 2, at 365 with Larissa 0. Isajiw, Legislative Survey, The Quality Education Act: Does Funding Buy Constitutionality?,20 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 249, 259 (1996) (concluding that funding is merely one of many factors
that affects the quality of education and suggesting that the New Jersey Supreme
Court's reliance on funding as the measure of educational quality is "myopic and
misplaced.").
See Iver Peterson, Whitman Puts Standards Above Money for Schools: She
Says
Spending Is Not the Way to Parity,N.Y. TIM, Jan. 12, 1996, at B5. In her second annual message to the state legislature, NewJersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman
noted that while educational expenditures increased dramatically in urban school
districts, student achievement remained stagnant and in some cases even regressed.
See id. Whitman contended that "making a direct link between high spending and
high achievement leads to a false conclusion." Id.; see also Roger Ricklefs, More Than
Money: Big Budgets Don't Boost Achievement, It's ParentalInfluence That Counts, WALL
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the poor, on the other hand, argue that funding disparities between
wealthy and poor school districts have a direct correlation to the
quality of education provided to students
As a launching pad to legal exploration of school funding issues
and their connection to delivery of an adequate education, NewJersey courts have viewed legal challenges in light of the state constitution's Thorough and Efficient Education Clause (T & E Clause).8
Landmark decisions explicating NewJersey's T & E Clause have put
the state at the forefront of public school finance reform and have
ST. J., March 31, 1989, at R34 (Education Supplement); What Doesn't Work, WALL ST.
J., June 27, 1989, at A16 (Review & Outlook) (noting that [m]oney doesn't buy
better education"). Ricklefs contends that boosting school budgets does not correlate with improved student achievement:
Our fixation on numbers-spending per pupil, teacher salaries, class
size-may only be distracting us from more-fundamental issues that
can't readily be expressed in numbers but that are far more important. It is even possible to argue that schools themselves don't matter
much, at least compared with parental influence.... Cash alone can't
do the trick.
Id.
SeeJoNATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUAITIES:

CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS

138-40 (1991). The author devotes a chapter to chronicling the impact of insufficient funds and antiquated or improper equipment on classroom teaching in Camden, New Jersey. See id. Because the schools cannot buy computers, students are
taught to type on old Olympia typewriters. See id. at 138-39. In addition, students in
science class are unable to achieve the results prescribed in their laboratory workbook because the lab uses makeshift supplies such as plastic cocktail glasses. See id.
at 139-40.
See NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1. The T & E Clause states: "The Legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the
ages of five and eighteen years." Id. The T & E Clause was added by an 1875
amendment to the 1844 NewJersey Constitution and was retained in the 1947 Constitution. See Levine v. Institutions & Agencies Dep't of N.J., 84 NJ. 234, 244-45,
418 A.2d 229, 234 (1980).
The T & E Clause became the focal point of a landmark constitutional challenge to the state's public school funding system-which was funded through local
property tax proceeds-as plaintiffs alleged the system produced gross disparities in
educational expenditures between various school districts. See Robinson v. Cahill,
62 NJ. 473, 481, 303 A.2d 273, 276 (1973) (Robinson 1). Originally, the plaintiffs
alleged that the disparate school-funding expenditures violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution. See Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 227, 287 A.2d 187, 189 (Law Div.
1972). The trial judge accepted these contentions and invalidated the State School
Incentive Equalization Aid Law. See id at 280, 287 A.2d at 217. On appeal, the New
Jersey Supreme Court specifically declined to rule on either equal protection basis,
expressing concern about the far-reaching implications such a conclusion would
have for all government services when any disparate expenditures exist. See Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 482-501, 303 A.2d at 277-87. The majority fashioned its ruling
strictly according to NewJersey's T & E Clause. See id.
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resulted in substantially increased funding for poorer school districts.' Other states, however, have achieved quite different results in
interpreting their own constitutional obligations to provide education funding! New Jersey's education funding cases fit squarely
within the supreme court's line of landmark decisions confronting
daunting social problems This jurisprudential record often extends
protection of individual rights further than those extended by the
United States Supreme Court.0
7 See Paul L. Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions:
Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RuTGERS L. REv. 365, 372 (1974) (comparing
New Jersey's landmark case with United States Supreme Court decisions in education-finance litigation). The author, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys involved in New
Jersey's education-finance litigation since 1970, notes that the New Jersey Supreme
Court insulated its decision from review by federal courts by grounding its decision
in the state constitution. See id. at 372-73. Professor Tractenberg's article contrasts
the New Jersey Superior Court decision in Robinson I, which included rulings
grounded in the United States Constitution, with the state supreme court decision.
See id. The author concludes from the comparison that state constitutions provide
greater authority for education advocates wishing to achieve progressive educational
reform and reformation of education-funding schemes in their own states. See id.
8 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (Serrano II); Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1). The California Supreme Court invalidated the local-control funding provisions of the state's school financing law as a
violation of the equal protection clause of the state constitution. See Serrano , 557
P.2d at 958. The court held that because the state recognizes education as a fundamental right, any allegations of discriminatory classifications in education should
face a strict scrutiny analysis. See id. Like New Jersey's cases challenging state education funding schemes, California's cases sought equalization of expenditures. See
Ronald Smothers, Forcing Change in Aid to Schools: Education Law Center Never Lost Its
Focus in 27 Years, N.Y. TIMEs, May 17, 1997, at 21. In contrast to NewJersey's approach, California's litigation has resulted in an overall lowering of the amount
spent across the board. See id. The author notes that California presently ranks
36th in the nation in per-pupil spending for public school education, while New
Jersey ranks first. See id.; see also Molly Ivins, Whitman Feels an Inevitable Backlash,
STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 29, 1997, at 27. In a column discussing escalating property taxes
as an issue in the NewJersey gubernatorial election, the author points out that California's cap on property taxes has contributed to the decline in funds spent for public education. See id. The column points out that California's schools, once considered among the finest in the nation, now rank 47th in student achievement. See id.
The article says art, music, and theater programs are no longer offered in California's public schools, schools have abandoned their libraries, facilities are aging and
crumbling, class sizes have grown dramatically, and parents are sending their children to private schools in increasing numbers. See id.
9 See, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (defining the
rights
of surrogate parents); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (striking down local zoning laws that excluded low- to
moderate-income housing in some communities); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405
A.2d 368 (1979) (protecting the right of unrelated, unmarried persons to live together despite local zoning prohibitions); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976) (finding a protected right to die within the constitutional right to privacy).
10 Compare Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298 (guaranteeing the constitu-
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In confronting issues of such magnitude, the New Jersey Supreme Court faces the competing challenges of staying its hand
whenever possible to protect its institutional legitimacy" and using
judicial review to preserve and defend the constitution. 12 Judicial review of legislative acts'3 enjoys a long and vibrant history in NewJertional right of every child to receive a thorough and efficient education) with San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right and that disparate educational funding levels do not
amount to a deprivation of equal protection under the 14th Amendment); compare
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 NJ. 287, 293, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (1982) (extending
the guarantee of access to medically necessary abortions to poor women) with Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980) (refusing to extend the abortion rights identified under Roe v. Wade to require access to abortion for poor women); compare
State v. Schmid, 84 NJ. 535, 568, 423 A.2d 615, 632-33 (1980) (extending the protection afforded free speech to include political speech in quasi-public private
property, including a university campus) with International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (holding that an airport is not a public
forum requiring access for free speech); compare State v. Saunders 75 N.J. 200, 220,
381 A.2d 333, 342 (1977) (protecting from prosecution certain consensual adult
sexual activities occurring within the zone of privacy) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that not all activities that occur in private-such as
state-proscribed homosexual conduct-are protected by the constitutional right to
privacy).
In State v. Hunt, the NewJersey Supreme Court recognized:
That this Court has the power to construe the NewJersey Constitution
to reach results contrary to United States Supreme Court decisions
construing the federal constitution is not controverted. Each state has
the "sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the federal Constitution."
State v. Hunt, 91 NJ. 338, 353, 450 A.2d 952, 959 (1982) (Pashman,J., concurring)
(citing Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)).
See genera/yJohnJ. Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction
to the Meaning of Separationof Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 435 (1974) (chronicling
the history ofjudicial review and the tension between the separate branches of government, and suggesting that any encroachment by one branch into another's
sphere risks the institutional legitimacy of that branch); see alsoJohnJ. Farmer, Jr.,
Mitigating "The Frailties of HumanJudgment" Justice Robert Clifford and the Sources of
JudicialLegitimacy, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1995) (reviewing the tenure
of Justice Robert Clifford during the New Jersey Supreme Court's most "activist"
years).
1
See Mount Laure4 92 N.J. at 287, 456 A.2d at 456. The Mount Laurel court
stated:
Judicial legitimacy may be at risk if we take action resembling traditional executive or legislative models; but it may be even more at risk
through failure to take such action if that is the only way to enforce
the Constitution.
In short, there being a constitutional obligation, we are not willing to allow it to be disregarded and rendered meaningless by declaring that we are powerless to apply any remedies other than those conventionally used.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13 See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 178 (1803)
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sey, but necessarily raises the issue of deference owed to coordinate
branches of government.' The constitutional delegation of responsibility for education to the legislature inherently implicates the
Separation of Powers Doctrine.'6 The balance a court strikes between
deference and judicial review" often defines that court's reputation. 18
(establishing the right of the judiciary to review the acts of Congress for compliance
with the Constitution and fixing the judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of government acts).
14 See ROBERT F. W.LLAmS, THE NEwJERsEY STATE CONSTTUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 4 (1990). The author points out that NewJersey's history ofjudicial review
predates the landmark decision in Marbuty. See id.
15 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MAITER OF INTERPRETATION:

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

LAW 21-22 (1997) (decrying dynamic statutory interpretation and revisionist efforts

at "judicial lawmaking" whereby courts endeavor to find the "unexpressed legislative
intent" of a law beyond the text of the law itself); see also Franklin v. New Jersey
Dep't of Human Servs., 111 N.J. 1, 18, 543 A.2d 1, 9 (1988) (maintaining that
courts should not invalidate legislation until it has been well tested and then only
"on the plainest and clearest of grounds."); Newark Superior Officers Ass'n v. City
of Newark, 98 N.J. 212, 222, 486 A.2d 305, 310 (1985) (stating that a statute should
be granted a presumption of validity "unless it is clearly repugnant to the Constitution."). But see Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 77, 389 A.2d
465, 476 (1978) ("Just as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its
enactments, it cannot curtail them through its silence, and the judicial obligation to
protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old as this country.") (citing King
v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 NJ. 161, 177, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (1974)); Vreeland v.
Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 323-24, 370 A.2d 825, 842 (1977) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)
(faulting the majority's invalidation of the legislature's nomination of an associate
justice to the NewJersey Supreme Court, calling for "judicial deference to the will
of the lawmakers whenever reasonable men might differ" on the constitutionality of
a law, and encouraging that "reasonably conflicting doubts should be resolved in
favor of validity.").
16 See BLAcK's LAw DIcnONARY 951-52 (6th ed. 1991) (explaining that
the governments of the states and of the United States are divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and stating that under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, "one branch is not permitted to encroach on the domain or exercise the
powers of another branch"); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2160
(1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Reformation Act as an unconstitutional
abrogation ofjudicial power). The Rores Court noted:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved
best when each part of the government respects both the Constitution
and the proper actions and determinations of the other branches....
[T]he courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison,
to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.
Id. at 2172; see also ROBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLxTCAL
SEDUCION OF THE LAw 4 (1990). The author contends that "the foundation of
American freedoms" is in large part secured by the Separation of Powers Doctrine.
See id. The inherent checks and balances prevent any one branch of the government from overstepping its bounds and impairing the freedoms of the people. See
id. "There is no faintest hint in the Constitution, however, that the judiciary shares
any of the legislative or executive power. The intended function of the federal
courts is to apply the law as it comes to them from the hands of others." Id.
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The NewJersey Supreme Court confronted these issues in Abbott
v. Burke (Abbott IV),' g in which the court assessed whether the Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act of 1996
(CEIFA or The Act)20 met the constitutional mandate of the T & E
Clause.2 ' Because CEIFA's regular education funding provisions did
not assure parity of expenditures between the state's Special Needs
Districts (SNDs)n and the wealthier suburban districts, the court
2
held those provisions unconstitutional as applied to the SNDs.

The NewJersey Constitution has an express separation of powers doctrine:
The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct
branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly
provided in this Constitution.
N.J. CONST. art. III,
1. On the federal level, the doctrine of the Separation of
Powers has been implied from the provisions of Articles I-III of the United States
Constitution. SeeBLAcK's LAw DicIoNARY 952 (6th ed. 1991). However, NewJersey
courts have not generally interpreted the state's express separation of powers doctrine as any more or less restrictive than the basic concept gleaned from the Federal
Constitution. See WILLIAMs, supra note 14, at 55-56. "We have heretofore said our
State Constitution is 'no more restrictive' in this respect than the Federal Constitution.... Indeed in our State the judiciary has accepted delegations of legislative
power which probably exceed federal experience." Id. (citing Brown v. Heymann,
62 N.J. 1, 9, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (1972)); see also Isajiw, supra note 2, at 259-60
(suggesting that the NewJersey Supreme Court has intruded upon the legislature's
rightful sphere in its education-funding decisions).
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAw viii (2d ed. 1988)
("Judicial authority to determine when to defer to others in constitutional matters is
a procedural form of substantive power; judicial restraint is but another form ofjudicial activism.").
is See Bernard K Ham, Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and Racial Segregation: A
Reconsideation of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 7 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 577, 615
(1997) (noting "the NewJersey court's activism has acted as a catalyst for legislative
action.... If true equality of opportunity and equality of treatment are to be attained in the face of legislative inaction, the need for judicial activism is needed and
justified").
19 149 N.J. 145, 693 A.2d 417 (1997) (Abbott
I).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-1 to -34 (West 1997).
2 SeeAbbott/I, 149 N.J. at 153, 693 A.2d at
421.
See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 386, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (1990) (AbbottfI).
In 1990, the State Department of Education (DOE) designated twenty-eight urban
school districts as special-needs districts (SNDs) based on the poverty and educational needs of the students attending the districts. See id. at 385-86, 575 A.2d at
408. Previously, in 1974, the DOE had divided school districts into District Factor
Groups (DFGs) according to socio-economic factors, with the urban districts of
lower socio-economic status grouped into DFGs A and B and the wealthier suburban districts of higher socio-economic status falling into DFGs I andJ. See id. at 386,
575 A.2d at 408-09.
23 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 153, 693
A.2d at 421.
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Children attending poor, urban, special needs public school
districts in NewJersey alleged that CEIFA failed to assure them their
constitutionally guaranteed right to a thorough and efficient education.24 The State contended that CEIFA was the first comprehensive
definition of the constitutional mandate that linked school funding
levels with the substantive education to be delivered.25 As such, the
State argued that the court owed CEIFA a presumption of validity, as
well as judicial deference to the administrative expertise of the Department of Education.
In April 1996, plaintiffs filed a motion in aid of litigants' rights,
alleging the state had failed to comply with the court's prior directives in Abbott v. Burke.27 The plaintiffs alleged the state had failed to
24

See id. at 152, 693 A.2d at 420. Original plaintiffs in this litigation were chil-

dren attending the public schools of Camden, East Orange, Irvington, and Jersey
City who brought suit on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated students in other urban school districts in the state. See Abbott v. Burke, 195 NJ. Super. 59, 61, 477 A.2d 1278, 1279 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1984). The plaintiffs alleged that the state's school-financing formula, which relies in part on local
property tax revenues, denies them the same educational opportunity afforded students attending public schools in wealthier communities. See id.
See Abbott IV, 149 NJ. at 165, 693 A.2d at 427. CEIFA prescribes corecurriculum content standards that the state uses to define the constitutional standard of a thorough and efficient education and assess compliance with that standard by each school district. See id. at 160-62, 693 A.2d at 425. To implement the
prescribed educational standard, the state devised an education financing scheme
based on a hypothetical "model" district and calculated the projected per-pupil cost
of implementing and attaining the content standards in this model district. See id.
at 163-64, 693 A.2d at 426. The per-pupil cost is the "thorough and efficient"
amount (T & E amount) that the state assumes school districts need in order to deliver a thorough and efficient education to their pupils. See id. at 164, 693 A.2d at
426. Although the T & E amount is not the minimum or the maximum that school
districts are required to spend per pupil, the state contends that it is the ideal
amount required in order to fund a thorough and efficient education and that any
expenditures by districts beyond that level are superfluous expenditures not required to meet the constitutional standard. See id. at 164-65, 693 A.2d at 426-27.
See id. at 174-75, 693 A.2d at 431-32.
27 See id. at 160, 693 A.2d at 424-25. Plaintiffs originally
filed suit in 1981 in the
Superior Court, Chancery Division, Mercer County, alleging the Public School Education Act of 1975 (1975 Act) denied their constitutional rights to a thorough and
efficient education. See id. at 154, 693 A.2d at 421. After comprehensive discovery,
the trial court, in November 1983, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. See id. The supreme court denied a motion for direct certification and the plaintiffs appealed. See id. The appellate division reversed the trial court, found the controversy justiciable on its constitutional merits, and remanded the matter for plenary action in the superior court.
See id. The NewJersey Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for certification onJuly 12, 1984. SeeAbbott v. Burke, 97 N.J. 669, 483 A.2d 187 (1984). The
supreme court, on July 23, 1985, reversed the appellate division, declined jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Commissioner of Education. See Abbott v.
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take the steps that would erase the funding disparity between the
wealthier school districts and the twenty-eight special needs districts
by the 1997-98 school year.28 In light of an education financing bill
pending in the legislature, the court denied the motion without
prejudice, allowing for renewal should the state fail to adopt proper
legislation by December 31, 1996." CEIFA was enacted on December 20, 1996VO In response, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for
relief on January 6, 1997.1
Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 302-03, 495 A.2d 376, 394 (1985) (Abbott I). In conjunction
with this ruling, the court required that fact-finding be held before an administrative lawjudge (ALJ). See id.
After eight months of hearings, the ALJ issued a comprehensive report finding
the 1975 Act unconstitutional, citing a statewide systemic failure that resulted in
plaintiffs' school districts failing to deliver the thorough and efficient level of education mandated by the constitution. See Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 297, 575 A.2d at 364.
The ALJ concluded that evidence linked disparities in school district wealth to the
disparate quality of education delivered. See id. The Commissioner of Education
rejected the ALJ's findings and the State Board of Education (BOE) affirmed. See
id. at 298-300, 575 A.2d at 364-65.
Plaintiffs appealed from the BOE's ruling, and the supreme court granted certification on April 28, 1989. SeeAbbott v. Burke, 117 N.J. 51, 563 A.2d 818 (1989).
The supreme court reversed the BOE, affirmed the findings of the ALJ, and ruled
the 1975 Act was unconstitutional as applied to the twenty-eight poor urban school
districts. See Abbott I, 119 N.J. at 394, 575 A.2d at 412. The court ordered the legislature to amend the 1975 Act to assure that the twenty-eight poor urban school districts would receive funding substantially equivalent to expenditures in the wealthier districts. See id. at 385-88, 575 A.2d at 408-09.
The legislature enacted the Quality Education Act of 1990 (QEA), which plaintiffs challenged on June 12, 1991, as unconstitutional. See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 158,
693 A.2d at 423; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-1 to -37 (West 1990) (repealed).
The supreme court declined to hear the claim, but remanded it to the superior
court, which, in an unpublished opinion issued Aug. 31, 1993, declared the QEA
unconstitutional for failing to assure that substantial funding parity would be
reached in a reasonable time. See Abbott lX, 149 N.J. at 158, 693 A.2d at 423-24. The
defendants appealed directly to the supreme court, which granted certification and
unanimously affirmed the superior court on July 12, 1994. See Abbott v. Burke, 136
N.J. 444, 464, 643 A.2d 575, 576 (1994) (per curiam) (Abbott L7). The court declined to order relief, but retained jurisdiction and set a September 1996 deadline
for the state to enact a new education financing law. See id. at 447-48, 643 A.2d at
576. The court mandated that the new law provide approximately 100% funding
parity for the 1997-98 school year. See id.
See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 160, 693 A.2d at 424. While the court did not enter
orders in Abbott III, the court nevertheless directed the state to meet a two-pronged
requirement: achieve substantial equivalence, approximating 100% of educational
expenses between the SNDs and the wealthier school districts, and provide funding
for programs to address the special extra-educational needs of children in the
SNDs. See AbbottIII, 136 N.J. at 447, 643 A.2d at 576.
SSee AbbottIV, 149 N.J. at 160, 693 A.2d at 425.
so SeeN.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-1 to -33 (West 1997).
31 See Anna Snider, State Asks Court to Look Beyond Funding in School
Case, 147 N.J.
L.J. 614, 614 (Feb. 10, 1997). The plaintiffs alleged that CEIFA "flouts the [c] ourt's
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Because CEIFA's regular education funding provisions failed to
guarantee parity of educational expenditures between poorer and
wealthier school districts, 2 the court declared CEIFA unconstitutional as applied to the SNDs.-" The court ordered the legislature to
increase funding to the twenty-eight SNDs to assure per-pupil expenditures that are equivalent to the state's wealthier districts. The
court also found CEIFA's supplemental aid provisions unconstitutional in that they inadequately addressed the special extraeducational needs of students in the SNDs. 5 The court did not enjoin administration of CEIFA's supplemental aid measures," but remanded the matter to the superior court to identify the specific special needs of students in the SNDs. 7
In the oldest case explaining the meaning of the T & E Clause,
Landis v. Ashworth," the state's highest court found the state constitution did not require statewide uniformity in education.3 For the first

time, the court defined a "thorough and efficient education" as one
equipping each child "for the ordinary duties of citizenship."o
4'
In the 1970 case Board of Education v. City Council of Elizabeth,

the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to consider a constitutional
challenge implicating the state's school financing scheme, suggesting in dicta it was a nonjusticiable matter.42 The court altered that
mandate in" Abbott III that the state achieve substantial parity of educational expenditures between the twenty-eight SNDs and the wealthier districts by the 1997-98
school year. See id. Eleven amicus curiae briefs were filed, all in support of the
plaintiffs, among them the City of Newark, the League of Women Voters of New
Jersey, the Black Ministers Council, the New Jersey School Boards Association, and
the NewJersey Education Association. Id.
32 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 176, 693 A.2d at 433.
s3 See id. at 177, 693 A.2d at 433.
M See id. at 224, 693 A.2d at 456.
35 See id. at 188, 693 A.2d
at 439.
36 See id. at 201, 693
A.2d at 445.
31 See id. at 199-200, 693
A.2d at 444.
m 57 N.J.L. 509 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
39 See id. at 512. In ruling on a constitutional challenge
to a local school tax, the
court declined to invalidate the tax, which supported a then-rare high-school level
education. See id.
40 Id. The court said the constitution's T & E Clause does not require the
legislature "to provide the same means of instruction for every child in the state." Id. In
setting forth the results expected from the constitution's education mandate, the
court said the T & E Clause's "purpose was to impose on the legislature a duty of
providing for a thorough and efficient system of free schools, capable of affording
to every child such instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship." Id.
41 55 N.J. 501, 262 A.2d 881
(1970).
42 See id. at 509, 262 A.2d at 885. Contesting an appropriation ordered by the
Commissioner of Education, the city council suggested that the constitutional man-
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view in the 1973 opinion of Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1),4S the first
supreme court case finding that the T & E Clause applies to educational expenditures." The court unanimously affirmed and modified 4 the law division's determination that the state's system of financing public schools was unconstitutional." After granting direct
certification,' 7 the NewJersey Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs'
equal protection claims under the state and federal constitutions.4'
date directing the legislature to assure delivery of a thorough and efficient education requires the state to fund such a system. See id. Foreshadowing the education
funding disputes to come, the court noted:
The corollary is that the present local tax process, which is practically
geared to the community's wealth and willingness to pay, is unconstitutional. We have grave doubts whether the question is properly one
for thejudiciary.... We are fully cognizant of the financial difficulties
of the older cities of the state which unquestionably have a declining
property tax base in relation to growing demands for governmental
services, including schools, than do most suburban communities ....
We only suggest that the source of a solution appears to be more legislative than judicial.
Id. at 509-10, 262 A.2d at 885.
4
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
.: See Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 280, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
45 See Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 521, 303 A.2d at 298.
46 See Robinson, 118 N.J. Super. at 280, 287 A.2d at 217. The plaintiffs challenged NewJersey's education financing system, which relied heavily on local property tax revenues to support the public school systems. See id. at 227-28, 287 A.2d at
189. Judge Botter found the state's school-financing scheme discriminated against
property-poor school districts and thus violated the Equal Protection Clauses of
both the NewJersey and United States Constitutions as well as NewJersey's T & E
Clause. See id. at 280, 287 A.2d at 217. The court also ruled the system discriminated against taxpayers by imposing "unequal burdens for a common state purpose." Id. The superior court issued a prospective order setting aJanuary 1, 1978,
deadline for the legislature to enact a school funding law that equalized educational
expenditures and imposed nearly uniform tax levies. See id. In the absence of legislative action, the trial court's ruling would have enjoined the state's educational expenditures effective January 1, 1974, and substituted a judicially molded remedial
plan. See id. at 281, 287 A.2d at 217.
4 See Robinson , 62 N.J. at 480, 303 A.2d at 276. The supreme court directly
certified the appeal. See id.
See id. at 501, 303 A.2d at 287. The court reasoned that disparate expenditures under a local funding option were an insufficient basis for an equal protection
claim in the absence of invidious discrimination. See id. at 484, 303 A.2d at 278.
The court ruled that wealth is not a suspect classification for equal protection challenges and found that the importance of home rule justified unequal tax burdens
in different communities. See id. at 494, 303 A.2d at 283-84. The court was conscious of avoiding the far-reaching implications of permitting equal protection challenges based on disparate local spending for public services. See id. at 499-500, 303
A.2d at 287. Specifically, the court noted that "[tihe equal protection proposition
potentially implicates the basic tenet of local government that there be local authority with concomitant fiscal responsibility." Id.
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Despite this ruling, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that
disparate expenditures among the state's school districts constituted
a violation of the T & E Clause.49 The court noted that the amount
spent on education was plainly relevant to the quality of education
delivered." The court pointed out that the state had produced "no
other viable criterion" by which to measure its compliance with the
constitutional mandate.5 ' While the court affirmed the findings of
the trial court, it declined to order relief, 2 asking instead for further
arguments from the litigants as to an appropriate remedy."
Revisiting the matter a month later, the court set a deadline for
the legislature to enact legislation equalizing educational expenditures statewide." The court withheld consideration of whether it had
See id. at 521, 303 A.2d at 298. In an effort to quantify the meaning of
the T &
E Clause, the court pointed out that when it was added to the constitution in 1875,
school funds were generated through a uniform, statewide property tax. See id. at
507, 303 A.2d at 291. That tax was then apportioned to the school districts based
on the number of eligible pupils by census count. See id. It was not until after the T
& E Clause was adopted that the state changed to a local ratables-based schoolfunding system. See id. at 508, 303 A.2d at 291. Ironically, the change was driven by
the then-wealthier urban counties, which believed the poorer rural counties were
intentionally undervaluing their ratables in an effort to avoid contributing their full
share to the statewide tax fund. See id.
The court determined that the state's reliance on local property taxes to finance education was "a patchy product reflecting provincial contests rather than a
plan sensitive only to the constitutional mandate." Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297. As
such, the court was comfortable directing the state to devise alternate means to assure a more equitable system of financing education. See id.
M See id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277. The court noted that "equality
of dollar input
will not assure equality in educational results," yet found convincing the evidence of
a "significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of educational opportunity." Id. The court concluded "that the quality of educational opportunity does depend in substantial measure upon the number of dollars invested." Id.
51 See id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295. 'Indeed the State has never
spelled out the
content of the educational opportunity the Constitution requires. Without some
such prescription, it is even more difficult to understand how the tax burden can be
left to local initiative with any hope that statewide equality of educational opportunity will emerge." Id.
2 See id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298. The trial judge had ordered
a redistribution of
the state's minimum support aid and save-harmless funds according to a judicially
crafted equalization formula. See id. at 521, 303 A.2d at 298.
3 See Robinson, 62 N.J. at 521, 303 A.2d at 298. In the interests of deference
to
coordinate branches of government and separation of powers, the court noted,
"The judiciary cannot unravel the fiscal skein.... [G]overnment must go on." Id.
at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 198, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973) (per curiam)
(Robinson B) (setting a December 31, 1974, deadline for the legislature to enact new
school financing legislation to take effect by July 1, 1975, for the 1975-76 school
year).
49
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the power to order a redistribution of state school aid in the event
the state failed to adopt appropriate legislation. 55 That issue arose a
year and one-half later when the legislature failed to enact legislation
in compliance with the substance of Robinson I and the deadline set
in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1)." In Robinson v. CahiU (Robinson
III), the court scheduled arguments regarding the extent of the
court's power to order redistribution of education funds. 7
When the case returned in Robinson v. CahiU (Robinson V), a decidedly less tentative supreme court ordered a redistribution of state
funds to increase aid to poorer school districts as well as equalize tax
burdens for support of education expenditures.-" This order was met
with criticism as unwarranted judicial activism.-" The majority under5

See id.

See Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 36, 335 A.2d 6, 6 (1975) (Robinson MI).
Deciding it was too late in the year for the court to order relief in time for 1975-76
school year, and wishing to avoid a "chaotic" impact on the adoption of local school
budgets, the court stayed its deadline and declined to interfere with distribution of
state education aid for the pending school year. See id. at 37, 335 A.2d at 7.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Pashman rebuked the majority for failing to stick
to the July 1, 1975, deadline it had ordered for a new school funding scheme. See
id. at 40, 335 A.2d at 8 (Pashman,J., dissenting). The dissent lamented:
The real question is: Can this Court, consistently with its obligations
to uphold and to enforce the Constitution, trade the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of hundreds of thousands of children to an equal
educational opportunity for the possibility of avoiding some difficulties in meeting local budget-making deadlines.... This Court has
identified a profound violation of the Constitution. It has given the
coordinate branch of government ample opportunity to take corrective action. It possesses the capacity to begin the process of remedying
the violation. To fail to do so at this late date is to become a party to
the perpetuation of the very wrongs which the Court denounced two
years ago.
Id. at 43-44, 335 A.2d at 10 (Pashman,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
57 See id. at 37-38, 335 A.2d at 7. The court scheduled
oral arguments for the
litigants on remedies, including (1) a definition of the state's thorough and efficient education obligation and its translation into financial terms, (2) the extent of
the court's power to order relief in this sphere, and (3) how the court should use its
power in the event it does order relief. See id.
58 See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 148-49, 351 A.2d 713, 720-21 (1975)
(Robinson V). The court noted that the urban school districts, those most plagued
by escalating tax rates and a corresponding "municipal overburden" of services demanding tax support, and other ratable-poor rural districts stood to gain the most
from the aid redistribution ordered. See id. at 151, 351 A.2d at 722.
See id. at 174, 351 A.2d at 735 (Mountain & Clifford, JJ., dissenting). "Today's
decision marks the Court's entrance into the business of financing public education.... [T]hejudiciary is conspicuously unsuited for shouldering the burdens of
that business, more appropriately left to the Legislature .... " Id. Citing the state
constitution's separation of powers doctrine, the dissenting justices said that appropriating public funds was "singularly and peculiarly the province of the Legislature."
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scored its respect for the Separation of Powers Doctrine,'* but reasoned that the court's role as the ultimate protector of constitutional
rights demanded action."1 Mindful of the deference owed to coordinate branches of government, the court noted that its "order may be
averted by timely and adequate legislative and administrative action. - 6
Following the court's ruling in Robinson IV, the legislature
adopted the Public School Education Act of 1975 (1975 Act).63 In
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I)), the court deferred to the 1975 Act as
a constitutionally acceptable exercise of legislative power and de-

Id. at 180, 351 A.2d at 738 (Mountain & Clifford,J.., dissenting).
Arguing from the other side of the spectrum, Justice Pashman concurred in
part and dissented in part, arguing that the majority's remedy did not go far
enough to redress the constitutional violations. See id. at 157, 351 A.2d at 725
(Pashman, J., concurring in part only and dissenting). To meet the mandate of
Robinson IJustice Pashman argued the court should remand the matter to the State
Board of Education for the formulation of standards to define the quality of education required by the constitution. See id. at 162, 351 A.2d at 728 (Pashman,J., concurring in part only and dissenting). The justice also pointed out that neither the
legislature nor the majority had provided a mechanism to guarantee the delivery of
the thorough and efficient education mandate in the event a municipality's tax rate
is too heavily weighted with competing government services to bear the burden of
raising additional funds for education. See id. at 170-73, 351 A.2d at 732-34
(Pashman, J., concurring in part only and dissenting). Justice Pashman said the
court should require the legislature to study the issue of municipal overburden and
adjust the incentive-equalization formula to compensate for this burden. See id. at
172, 351 A.2d at 733 (Pashman, J., concurring in part only and dissenting). "The
failure of the Court to attempt to do so simply buries the cities of NewJersey a little
deeper in social and financial difficulties." Id. at 172-73, 351 A.2d at 733-34
(Pashman,J., concurring in part only and dissenting).
W See id. at 142-43, 351 A.2d at 717. The majority noted that the court deferred
to the legislature to correct the constitutional deficiencies and declined to order
relief in each of the three prior Robinson opinions. See id. The majority also noted,
"[T]he Court's function is to appraise compliance with the Constitution, not to legislate an educational system, at least if that can in any way be avoided." Id. at 145,
351 A.2d at 719.
61 See id. at 154, 351 A.2d at 724. Writing for the majority,
ChiefJustice Hughes
said:
This Court, as the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution's command, possesses and must use power equal to its responsibility. Sometimes, unavoidably incident thereto and in response to a
constitutional mandate, the Court must act, even in a sense seem to
encroach, in areas otherwise reserved to other Branches of government. And while the court does so, when it must, with restraint and
even reluctance, there comes a time when no alternative remains.
That time has now arrived.
Id. at 154-55, 351 A.2d at 724.
62 Id. at 151, 351 A.2d
at 722.
63 1975 N.J. Laws 18A:7A-1
to -33.
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clined to implement its own remedy from Robinson IV. 6 The court
found that the new school-financing law was responsive to the mandate of Robinson 1,5 and held that it was facially constitutional if fully
funded.' Concurring87 and dissenting" justices, as well as the majority opinion itself, 9 expressed misgivings about the 1975 Act's constitutionality in operation, but the majority felt such concerns were insufficient to render the Act facially unconstitutional. 0 The court
See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467-68, 355 A.2d 129, 132 (1976) (per curiam) (Robinson V).
See Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 464, 355 A.2d at 137. The court noted that the 1975
Act implemented new forms of state aid designed to reduce the "'discordant correlations between the educational needs of the school districts and their respective tax
bases.'" Id. (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 298 (1973)
(Robinson 1)). The three main categories of aid were categorical aid for handicapped and impaired students based on a per-pupil weighted average, transportation aid, and equalization aid to offset the lower property valuations of poorer districts. See id.
See id. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139. The court vacated its order enjoining distribution of state education aid from Robinson IVand declared the 1975 Act in full effect.
See id. at 468, 355 A.2d at 139. The court retained jurisdiction over the case and indicated it would consider remedial action if the legislature failed by April 6, 1976, to
enact provisions fully funding the 1975 Act for the 1976-77 school year. See id.
67 See id. at 468, 355 A.2d at 139 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
Chief Justice
Hughes expressed strong reservations about the 1975 Act's provisions for nonequalizing minimum support aid to all districts, including wealthy districts. See id.
at 472, 355 A.2d at 141 (Hughes, C.J., concurring). The chiefjustice also suggested
that the state's equalization aid formula was inadequate to bring the poorer school
districts up to the spending level of the wealthier districts. See id. at 473, 355 A.2d at
142 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
See id. at 476, 355 A.2d at 143 (Conford, P.J.A.D., t/a, concurring and dissenting) (stating that the 1975 Act inadequately equalized disparities in property valuation and characterizing the minimum aid and save-harmless aid provisions that continued support to wealthy districts as anti-equalizing); see also id. at 512, 355 A.2d at
163 (Pashman,J., dissenting) (calling for the court to remand to the superior court
for plenary hearings on the question of the 1975 Act's constitutionality in operation).
69 See id. at 466, 355 A.2d at 138. The majority expressed concern that the 1975
Act provided no remedy for municipal overburden, placed a seemingly arbitrary
limit on annual budget increases, and failed to weigh state aid according to special
needs of students, such as children on welfare. See id. at 466-67, 355 A.2d at 138.
The majority also noted that the 1975 Act continued minimum-aid provisions to
wealthier districts that the court felt would add to the disparate funding levels between poorer and wealthier school districts. See id. at 467, 355 A.2d at 138.
70 See id. at 465, 355 A.2d at 137. The majority accepted the 1975 Act's funding
levels as "the Legislature's best effort to prophesy" how much state aid would be
needed to implement the act fully. Id. The court said its misgivings about the
funding provisions were insufficient to render the act unconstitutional in light of
the 1975 Act's "positive steps to eliminate gross disparities in per pupil expenditures and tax resources." Id. at 467, 355 A.2d at 138. The court concluded that
"[o]nly actual experience with the Act" would reveal whether the new education financing provisions passed constitutional muster. Id.
6
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noted that the 1975 Act was the first effort by the state to reach a
comprehensive definition of the thorough and efficient education
mandate.7' Accordingly, the court afforded
the 1975 Act a strong
7
presumption of constitutional validity.
The education funding dispute came to a head when the state
failed to adopt legislation assuring full funding of the 1975 Act by
the court-mandated deadline. " In an unprecedented ruling,7' the
court in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI) enjoined disbursement of all
75
school funds, effective July 1, 1976, for the 1976-77 school year.
This forced the closing of public schools statewide. 6 Commenting
that an injunction is "a traditional remedy," the court stated that its
order did not amount to "unwarranted judicial 'activism.'" 77 Further,
the court suggested that failure to act "'would be to recognize judicial futility.'" 78 Dissents by Justices Mountain and Pashman presented opinions at opposite ends of the spectrum during this moment of constitutional exigency. Justice Mountain argued that the
Separation of Powers Doctrine and concerns of judicial "legitimacy"
should stay the court's hand from ordering specific relief.80 In sharp
71 See Robinson V, 69 NJ. at 455, 355 A.2d at 132. The court noted that the
1975
Act set 10 broad elements that constitute a thorough and efficient education. See id.
at 456-57, 355 A.2d at 132-33. The 1975 Act instituted a comprehensive, individual
assessment and monitoring process to assure each school district would adequately
deliver those essential elements. See id. The 1975 Act also granted the Commissioner of Education broad remedial powers to redress the failure of any school district to provide a thorough and efficient education. See id. While the list of major
elements did not include "the requisite of sufficient fiscal support," the court suggested that "[plerhaps this [funding] is implied." Id. at 457, 355 A.2d at 133.
72 See id. at 456, 355 A.2d at 132. The majority noted, "It is
our conclusion that
the Public School Education Act of 1975 is in all respects constitutional on its face,
again assuming it is fully funded." Id. at 467, 355 A.2d at 139.
, See Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 159, 358 A.2d 457, 459
(1976) (per curiam) (Robinson V).
14 See Lisa Brennan, New School-FundingAdvocate Gears Up for Next
Battle, 142 N.J.
L.J. 815, 830 (Dec. 4, 1995) (noting that the NewJersey Supreme Court's order resulting in the closure of the state's schools was "the first time in the nation's 200year history that the school system of an entire state had been shut down").
75 See Robinson V, 70 N.J. at 160-61,
358 A.2d at 459.
76 See Education-FinancingBattle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at B5 (noting
that although the bulk of the state's school children were on summer recess, the 1976
spending freeze locked out some 100,000 summer school students for more than a
week).
7 Robinson VI, 70 N.J. at 160 n.1, 358 A.2d at 459 n.1 (citation omitted).
78 Id. (quoting PROFESSOR Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOvERNMENT

95 (1976)).

79 See id. at 163, 358 A.2d at 460 (Mountain, J., dissenting); id. at 170, 358 A.2d

at 465 (Pashman,J., dissenting).
80 See id. at 163, 358 A.2d at 460 (Mountain, J., dissenting). Justice Mountain
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contrast, Justice Pashman argued for ajudicially crafted school funding scheme rather than a mere injunction.8 '
In response to the court's order in Robinson W, the legislature
passed New Jersey's first income tax,8 which was earmarked for offsetting local property taxes, including school taxes.' The supreme
court on July 9, 1976, rescinded its order enjoining disbursement of
all school funds, and the 1975 Act became fully operational.4
The next constitutional challenge to the state's public education financing came in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I).85 When Abbott I
reached the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1985, the court weighed
the case's justiciability on its constitutional merits against the traditional rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies." The
court decided the matter should be heard before the Commissioner
of Education in deference to the Department of Education's administrative expertise.7 Due to the Commissioner of Education's status
as a defendant in the suit, however, the court directed that the hearing and fact-finding be held before an administrative law judge
(ALJ) .
When the case returned to the supreme court five years later,"9
the court was presented with a comprehensive record compiled by
the ALJ. The report cited gross disparities in educational expenditures between the property-rich suburban districts and the propertypoor urban districts.9 The ALJ also found a correlative disparity in
noted that it is respect for the court's legitimacy that compels other branches of
government to support the court's constitutional decisions even when they disagree.
See id. at 163-64, 358 A.2d at 461 (Mountain,J., dissenting).
81 See id. at 170, 358 A.2d at 465 (Pashman,J., dissenting).
See Brennan, supra note 74, at 830.
9See WitLuAMs, supranote 14, at 115.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 465, 465, 360 A.2d 400, 400 (1976) (Robinson
Vi).
See Abbott v. Burke, 195 N.J. Super. 59, 61, 477 A.2d 1278, 1279 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1984). The appellate division reversed the trial court's dismissal of
the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, ruling the matter properly
justiciable as a constitutional matter and remanding the case to the superior court.
See id. at 73-74, 477 A.2d at 1285.
SeeAbbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269, 302-03, 495 A.2d 376, 394 (1985) (Abbott 1).
See id. at 301, 495 A.2d at 393.
8 See id. at 303, 495 A.2d at 394.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text (tracing the procedural history
of
the Abbott cases).
See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 357-68, 575 A.2d 359, 394-400 (1990)
(Abbott I). The court contrasted some of the differing educational offerings in the
state's suburban versus urban school districts to highlight the inferior level of educational resources available in the urban schools. See id. at 359, 575 A.2d at 394.
While the South Orange-Maplewood district offered computer instruction for kin-
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the quality of education delivered in the wealthier versus the poorer
districts. 9 The ALJ recommended a new "high foundation" school
financing scheme that would enable the poorer districts to achieve
funding parity with the wealthier districts.9
In a unanimous opinion, the supreme court in Abbott v. Burke
(Abbott I) held the 1975 Act unconstitutional in operation as applied
to poorer school districts because it failed to assure sufficient funding to deliver the T & E mandate. The court adopted the ALJ's record, which indicated that the 1975 Act had actually increased the
funding disparities between the state's poorest and wealthiest school
districts." The majority also adopted the ALJ's finding that a correlation existed between the expenditure level per pupil and the quality of education delivered. 95
Applying its enhanced T & E standard, the court held that gross
disparities in funding, coupled with disparities in quality of educadergartners and had a computer lab in every school, Paterson offered no computer
program and Camden offered computer instruction tojust 3.4% of its students. See
id. While Montclair schools housed an art workroom in every school, East Orange
offered no art rooms in any elementary schools. See id. at 361, 575 A.2d at 396.
While the urban districts provided remedial education for 30% to 53% of their students, Millburn had just 4% of its students receiving remedial education. See id. at
362, 575 A.2d at 397. School facilities in the urban districts were deemed to be
crumbling, crowded, and "conducive to a deficient education." Id. at 363, 575 A.2d
at 397. Regarding facilities, the majority noted:
[M]ost schools in richer suburban districts are newer, cleaner, and
safer. They provide an environment conducive to learning. They
have sufficient space to accommodate the children's needs now and in
the future. While it is possible that the richest of educations can be
conferred in the rudest of surroundings, the record in this case demonstrates that deficient facilities are conducive to a deficient education.
Id.
See id. at 297, 575 A.2d at 364.
SSee id.
3 See id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408. The court expanded Robinson rs definition
of
a thorough and efficient education beyond equipping a student to compete in the
labor market:
It means being able to fulfill one's role as a citizen, a role that encompasses far more than merely registering to vote. It means the ability to
participate fully in society, in the life of one's community, the ability
to appreciate music, art, and literature, and the ability to share all of
that with friends.
Id. at 363-64, 575 A.2d at 397.
See id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 382-83 (finding that the gap in average per-pupil
expenditures from the poorer to the wealthier districts had grown from $800 per
pup il before the adoption of the 1975 Act to $1,135 per pupil in 1984-85).
See id. at 381, 575 A.2d at 406. The court refuted the state's argument that
money is not a critical factor in the quality of education delivered. See id. at 376-77,
575 A.2d at 403-04.

1997]

NEWJERSEY SCHOOL FUNDINGLITIGA TION

637

tion, amounted to a constitutional violation." Building on the ruling
of Robinson I, the court held that the T & E Clause required
"substantially equivalent" educational expenditures for the state's
poorer districts. The court further declared that state aid must assure that the urban districts have sufficient funding to address the
special disadvantages faced by many of their students."0
The court ordered the legislature to amend the 1975 Act to provide that the twenty-eight SNDs would receive substantially equivalent funding to that of the wealthier districts."0 The court also ordered that the funding address the special, extra-educational needs
of disadvantaged students in the twenty-eight urban districts.' 00 The
court deferred to the legislature to correct the constitutional violations, but with the caveat that the new financing scheme could not
depend on a district's ability to generate revenue from local taxes.""
In Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), the NewJersey Supreme Court declared the legislative response to Abbott II, the Quality Education Act
of 1990 (QEA),1 n unconstitutional.' ' The court found that the QEA
0
failed to assure substantial funding parity within a reasonable time' '
and did not guarantee funding levels because it relied on the discretionary actions of government officials.'05 The court also found that
96

98

See AbbottHI, 119 N.J. at 384-85, 575 A.2d at 408.
See id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408.

See id.

See id. at 386-88, 575 A.2d at 409.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 386, 575 A.2d at 409.
102 1990 N.J. Laws 18A:7D-1 to -37 (repealed).
1 See Abbott v. Burke, 136 N.J. 444, 446-47, 643 A.2d 575, 576 (1994)
(per curiam) (Abbott II).
104 See id. at 450-51, 643 A.2d at
478.
105 See id. at 451, 643 A.2d at 578; see also Reverse Robin Hoods, EAsT ORANGE REc.,
Jan. 31, 1991, at 4. In an editorial, the newspaper faulted the NewJersey Legislature for cutting the QEA by $395 million. See id. The newspaper criticized the legislature's cutting aid targeted for urban schools and dispersing that "money instead
for property tax relief statewide." Id. The newspaper opined that legislators were
motivated by fear of voter backlash to GovernorJim Florio's tax increase of 1990 in
the wake of United States Senator Bill Bradley's near loss to Christine Todd Whitman in that fall's election. See id. The editorial concluded:
[S]o few in Trenton have the courage to stand up for their convictions, for what they know is right ....
[But] the state Supreme Court has courage, which was demonstrated by its ruling in the Abbott vs. Burke landmark case. If Trenton
fails to fulfill its charge to correct the inequities cited in the state's
education funding formula, then we'll have to revisit the issue-back
in court.
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the QEA utilized an arbitrary "special needs" weighing factor for aid
that was not tied to any empirical evidence that reflected the actual
needs of urban youngsters.'06
The court refrained from ordering a remedy in Abbott III because the new state administration was devising an education funding act to replace the QEA. ' 7 The court took note that the state had
increased funding to urban school districts substantially since Abbott
II, indicating a constitutionally legitimate response.'0 8 The court,
however, directed the state to meet a two-pronged mandate: assuring approximately one hundred percent funding parity for the 199798 school year, and providing for the special extra-educational needs
of urban school children.'9 The court directed the Department of
Education to conduct studies of the specific special needs of urban
students, to devise programs to serve those needs, and to guarantee
funding levels to implement those programs."0 The court retained
jurisdiction and gave the state a September 1996 deadline."' The
court cautioned, however, that a court-imposed remedy would be
implemented earlier if the state failed to reduce the sixteen percent
funding disparity by the 1995-96 school year, or if it appeared that
the state would not meet full funding parity by 1997-98.2
Against this backdrop of precedent, the New Jersey Supreme
Court again reviewed the constitutionality of the state's public school
financing system in the spring of 1997.' 3 In Abbott 1V, the court adjudged the legislative response to Abbott III, the Comprehensive Educational Improvement Act of 1996, unconstitutional as applied to the
state's twenty-eight SNDs."1 In a five to one opinion by Justice Han106 See Abbott HI, 136 NJ. at 452-58, 643 A.2d at 579
(finding that the state conducted no studies of the actual extra-educational needs of urban youngsters and
concluding that the state's adoption of a "special needs" weighing factor for funding was, therefore, necessarily arbitrary and insufficient to meet the mandate of Abbott fl).
107 See id. at 447, 648 A.2d
at 576.
108 See id. State aid to urban school districts had increased by $700 million since
Abbott I, while there had been no increase in aid to wealthier districts, and the disparity in per-pupil expenditures in urban districts had been reduced from 25-30%
of expenditures in wealthier districts to 16%. See id.
109 Seid.
1o See id. at 453, 643 A.2d at 579. The court noted that because these special-

needs programs are unique to the urban districts, they must be funded through additional appropriations above and beyond the regular education funding. See id. at
454, 643 A.2d at 580.
"I
See id. at 447-48, 643 A.2d at 577.
1
See Abbott I, 136 NJ. at 447, 643 A.2d at 577.
3 eAbbott v. Burke, 149 N.J. 145, 152, 693 A.2d 417, 420 (1997) (Abbott V).
1
See id. at 153, 693 A.2d at 421.
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dler," ' the court said CEIFA's regular education funding provisions
do not guarantee parity of expenditures between the SNDs and the
state's wealthier school districts.16 The court ordered the legislature
to guarantee equivalence of per-pupil expenditures for the 1997-98
school year and to assure that all remedial funds are spent in furtherance of the T & E content standards enumerated in CEIFA." 7
The court also found CEIFA's "special needs" provisions were not
adequately tailored to meet the unique extra-educational needs of
youngsters attending the SNDs."8 Accordingly, the court remanded
the case to the superior court to identify the specific "special needs"
of urban youngsters, to devise programs to remediate those needs,
and to identify the practical costs of funding such programs." 9
The majority began by analyzing CEIFA's two-pronged approach
to identifying and implementing the thorough and efficient education standard mandated by the constitution.'2 First, CEIFA devised
core-curriculum content standards to qualify and explain the
"thorough" component of the education clause.' 2 ' Second, to meet
See id. at 152, 693 A.2d at 420. Chief Justice Poritz, Attorney General at the
time CEIFA was written, did not participate in the decision, and Justice Garibaldi
dissented. See Abby Goodnough, New Jersey's School FinancingIsAgain Held Unconstitutional N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1997, at B6 (explaining that ChiefJustice Poritz helped
write CEIFA while Attorney General of the state).
116See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 175, 693 A.2d at 432. The majority stated, "CEIFA
will perpetuate a two-tiered school system in which the students in the wealthier districts will have the resources necessary either to meet or to exceed the standards,
and in which the poorer urban districts will be asked to do the same or more with
less." Id.
"7
See id. at 224, 693 A.2d at 456.
11 See id. at 185, 693 A.2d at 437.
19 See id. at 224-25, 693 A.2d at
456-57.
120 See id. at 161, 693 A.2d
at 425.
121 See id. CEIFA prescribes comprehensive core-curriculum content
standards
that codify the state's definition of what comprises a thorough education. See id.
The standards establish "achievement goals" in seven academic areas: "visual and
performing arts, comprehensive health and physical education, language-arts literacy, mathematics, science, social studies, and world languages." Id. The goals set in
these subjects include fifty-six curriculum standards and 880 "student progress indicators." Id. at 161 n.6, 693 A.2d at 425 n.6. The academic standards are complemented by five "cross-content workplace readiness standards": career planning,
technology, critical thinking, decision-making and problem solving, selfmanagement, and safety. Id. These career-targeted standards are in conformity
with the court's prior definition of a thorough and efficient education as one readying students to become citizens and competitors in the modem work force. See
Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973) (Robinson 1). CEIFA
leaves it to the individual school districts, with guidance from the Department of
Education, to outline the curriculum to meet the content standards, although an
enhanced state testing and assessment program would gauge each district's performance according to the standards. See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 161-62, 693 A.2d at
15
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the "efficient" component, the Act quantified the cost of implementing the content standards in a hypothetical "model" school district.'2
The majority accepted CEIFA's core-curriculum content standards as a constitutionally adequate exposition of the T & E mandate. 12 The court accorded the Act a presumption of validity as a
proper use of legislative power and deferred to the content standards
as an exercise of administrative expertise. ' 24 Looking to the act as a
whole, however, the court did not accord the same level of deference
to GEIFA's funding provisions.'" The court rejected the state's hypothetical "model" district as the basis for a constitutionally acceptable
T & E funding amount, 12' noting that the model district is not comparable to the special needs districts'2
nor does it resemble the
1 28
state's top-performing school districts.
425. The Act specifies that a fourth-grade level Elementary School Proficiency Assessment Test will be added to the current eighth-grade Early Warning Test and the
eleventh-grade High School Proficiency Test. See id. at 162, 693 A.2d at 425.
1
See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 163, 693 A.2d at 426. To devise a financing
scheme
to implement the new T & E standard, CEIFA created a hypothetical "model"
school district consisting of an elementary school serving 500 youngsters, a middle
school with 675 pupils, a high school of 900 students, and a central administration
office. See id. The Act set a per-pupil funding level of $6,720, plus or minus $336,
which was hypothetically sufficient to deliver the T & E standard in that model district. See id. at 164, 693 A.2d at 426. That amount served as the base funding
amount that each district would be assured under CEIFA for the 1997-98 school
year. See id. The Act allowed expenditures above or below the T & E amount, but
the State contended that any expenditures above that amount were superfluous
amounts not needed for the delivery of a thorough and efficient education pursuant to the core-curriculum content standards. See id. at 164-65, 693 A.2d at 426-27.
121 See id. at 166-67, 693 A.2d at 427-28 (recounting that the
court in Abbott II, in
the absence of an alternative criterion by which to measure a thorough and efficient
education, relied on the financial input of the most successful districts, the property
rich suburban districts, as the measuring stick for a thorough and efficient education).
124 See id. at 168, 693 A.2d at 428. The majority
called the content standards "the
first real effort on the part of the legislative and executive branches to define and to
implement the educational opportunity required by the Constitution." Id.
P See id. at 168-69, 693 A.2d at 428-29 (noting that promulgating standards does
not assure achievement of a thorough and efficient education, and stating that in
the absence of adequate funding and resources, the content standards have little
practical effect).
126 See id. at 174, 693 A.2d at 431. The court noted that CEIFA's
T & E amount is
a mere $80 more than the QEA's funding level, which the court struck down in Abbott III as arbitrary and insufficient. See id. The majority explained, "it is difficult to
fathom how eighty dollars could solve the constitutional problem." Id.
12
See id. at 172-74, 693 A.2d at 430-31. The court explained that CEIFA's
.model" district shares none of the unique challenges facing the special needs districts, such as old, crumbling facilities, pupils from a disadvantaged socio-economic
background in need of extra-educational programs and services, and enhanced security needs. See id. The court rejected the use of an abstract "model" district as the
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The court next considered the state's argument that CEIFA
should be accorded a presumption of validity and deemed facially
constitutional.'2 9 The majority conceded that a presumption of validity is normally owed to legislation, but held that because no rational
basis existed for CEIFA's "model"-based financing provisions, any
presumption of validity was rebutted.'-*
Because the court found CEIFA's "model" district inadequate,
the majority looked to the state's wealthiest, most successful districts"'
as the measure of a constitutionally sufficient education.' 2
The court ordered the legislature to assure that the poorer districts
received funding equivalent to the current per-pupil expenditures in
3
the wealthier districts by the beginning of the 1997-98 school year,' 3
thus affirming the court's rulings in both Abbott II and Abbott III.' 4
basis for financing education to the needy districts involved in this litigation. See id.
128 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 169, 693 A.2d at 429. The court rejected the state's
contention that any per-pupil spending above and beyond the T & E amount in the
wealthier school districts represented excessive expenditures for programs, materials, and services that are not needed to meet the T & E mandate. See id. The court
noted that educators and public interest groups lobbied the legislature to amend
CEIFA to allow districts to spend beyond the T & E amount. See id. at 170, 693 A.2d
at 430. Voters in the most wealthy districts approved supplemental budgets for expenditures well beyond the T & E amount, all of which suggested to the court that
these expenditures are not superfluous, but "secure genuine educational benefits."
See id. at 170-71, 693 A.2d at 430. The court also said the practical result of basing
CEIFA's funding provisions on an abstract, "model" district is to label both the
SNDs and the state's wealthier, successful school districts "inefficient" because neither group complies with CEIFA's definition of "efficient" per-pupil spending. See
id. at 175, 693 A.2d at 432.
129 See id. at 174, 693 A.2d at 431.
M See id. at 174-75, 693 A.2d at 431-32. The majority answered the dissent's argument for deference to a coordinate branch of government by stating that a presumption of validity should not be viewed as "impenetrable" merely because the
state's decisions "allegedly rest on the opinions of experts." Id. at 174, 693 A.2d at
432.
SSee supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the State Board
of Education's classification of school systems into District Factor Groups based on socioeconomic status). The court looked to the districts in DFGs I and J as its standard
for a thorough and efficient education. See Abbott V, 149 NJ. at 196, 693 A.2d at
442.
132 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 176, 693 A.2d at 432 (noting that
because the I andJ
districts are providing a high-quality education that meets the thorough and efficient standard, it is "eminently reasonable" that those districts should continue to
be the court's focus).
3 See Passell, supra note 1, at B7 (noting that the court's order will
funnel an
additional $1,000 per pupil into the state's poorest school districts for a total of
$250 million in extra state spending for the SNDs in the 1997-98 school year).
SSee Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 196-97, 693 A.2d at 442-43. Data from
the state
showed that the average expenditure for the 1996-97 school year in the DFG I andJ
districts was $8,181 per pupil, while spending in the SNDs varied from $6,751 per
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Although the court invalidated CEIFA's funding provisions for
regular education, the opinion did not discount CEIFA's core curriculum content standards.'" Instead, the court directed the Commissioner of Education to assure that the funds added for urban
schools are spent efficiently toward the delivery of CEIFA's content

standards. '"
The court also reaffirmed its position in Abbott II and Abbott III
that urban school children in the SNDs are confronted with much
greater obstacles to learning as a result of their disadvantaged socioeconomic background.' 37 The court reiterated that the state, as part
of its constitutional obligation to assure a thorough and efficient
education, must guarantee that these special needs are adequately
addressed."5 As the court opined in its earlier Abbott decisions, the
pupil in Pleasantville to $9,605 per pupil in Hoboken. See id. at 197, 693 A.2d at
442-43. In the aggregate, the I andJ districts would spend 10.65% more for regular
educational programs than the SNDs. Se id. at 197 n.35, 693 A.2d at 443 n.35. Projected I and J average spending for 1997-98 was $8,431 per pupil. See id. at 197
n.36, 693 A.2d at 443 n.36. The majority ruled that "[bjy the commencement of
the 1997-1998 school year, the State must guarantee that each SND has the money
required to spend at the DFG I &J average budgeted (as opposed to predicted) per
pupil expenditure." Id. at 197, 693 A.2d at 443.
See id. at 166, 693 A.2d at 427. The majority said:
We fully acknowledge the substantial efforts of the coordinate
branches to develop and to establish a comprehensive statutory and
administrative system for public education founded on standards that
define the substantive meaning of education and that provide for
measures of educational performance and achievement. We conclude
that the statutory standards are consistent with the Constitution's education clause.
Id.
S
See id. at 194, 693 A.2d at 442. The court required that
the Commissioner use his statutory and regulatory authority to ensure
that the increased funding that we have ordered today be put to optimal educational use. The Commissioner shall apply the additional
funding to the improvement of the students' ability to achieve the
content standards in the special needs districts. That injunction is
both necessary and appropriate to assure the efficacy of monetary relief.
Id.
"3 See id. at 177-79, 698 A.2d at 433-34. Discussing the ALJ's
fact-finding pursuant to Abbott I, the court chronicled endemic social problems in urban communities
that impair children's readiness and receptiveness to education, such as poverty,
crime, the scourge of drugs, poor health, illness, unstable home life, racial isolation,
and other societal ills. See id.
"5s See id. at 179, 693 A.2d at 434. In Abbott 1I, the court directed
the Commissioner of Education to conduct studies to determine the extent of the special, extraeducational needs of urban students, to devise programs to address those needs,
and to assure adequate funding to implement those programs. SeeAbbott v. Burke,
136 NJ. 444, 454, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (1994) (per curiam) (Abbott IM).
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majority said the state has a responsibility to assure that urban school
districts have sufficient programs and funding to provide the supplemental services that urban students need to receive an adequate
education.'3 9 In analyzing CEIFA's efforts to address these special
needs,' 40 the court found that the state did not conduct any studies
to determine the actual extra-educational needs of urban students."'
Therefore, the court concluded that the dollar amounts provided in
CEIFA to fund "special needs" programs were arbitrary and failed to
satisfy the order of Abbott II.42
The court also noted that CEIFA "completely fails to address"
the dire physical conditions of many urban schools, including the
need for improvement of existing buildings and construction of new
facilities."4 In affirming the findings of Abbott I the court maintained that in order to provide a thorough and efficient education, a
school district must be able to offer an environment conducive to
learning, which necessarily requires upgrading facilities in the
SNDs.'"
To assure that the extra-educational needs of students in the
SNDs are studied and addressed, the court remanded the case to the

139 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 180, 693 A.2d at 434 (citing Abbott II and Abbott II and
finding that these needs are unique to urban areas and should be met in the form
of supplemental aid over and above regular education expenditures).
140 See id., 693 A.2d at 435. CEIFA provides for two types of supplemental aid designed to address the unique extra-educational needs of urban youngsters: Demonstrably Effective Program Aid (DEPA) for class-size reduction, parent education
programs, and job training programs and Early Childhood Program Aid (ECPA) for
full-day kindergarten, preschool classes, and other early childhood programs and
services. See id. at 180-83, 693 A.2d at 435-36. CEIFA provides that both DEPA and
ECPA be funded according to a district's needs. See id. at 180, 693 A.2d at 435.
1
See id. at 180, 693 A.2d at 435.
See id. at 185, 693 A.2d at 437. The majority pointed out:
1
The State contends that experts were involved in formulating the
amounts of DEPA and ECPA and that the Court should defer to their
determinations. Children in the special needs districts have been
waiting more than two decades for a constitutionally sufficient educational opportunity. We are unwilling, therefore, to accede to putative
expert opinion that does not disclose the reasons or bases for its conclusions. We have ordered the State to study the special educational
needs of students in the SNDs. That has not been done. We also have
ordered the State to determine the costs associated with implementing the needed programs. Those studies have not occurred. Without
studies of actual needs, it is unclear how a sound program providing
for those needs has been accomplished.
Id.
143
14

See id. at 186-88, 693 A.2d at 437-38.
See id. at 188, 693 A.2d at 438.
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superior court for further proceedings.' 4 The court set a December
31, 1997, deadline for the superior court to render a decision and
retained jurisdiction to review the results.'*
Taking note of separation of powers concerns, the majority
stressed that the court had repeatedly deferred to the will of the legislature and the expertise of the Commissioner of Education, but
that the state had repeatedly failed to implement the court's directives. 147 Echoing the sentiments of Robinson IV and Robinson VI, the
majority asserted that it could not allow the constitutional deprivation it had identified to persist uncorrected.'4 Stressing that there
was "no alternative remedy," the court said judicial relief was required to "vindicate the constitutional rights of the school children
in the poverty-stricken urban districts." m
"
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi asserted that CEIFA is
facially constitutional.'-" The lone dissenter said that the Separation
of Powers Doctrine required the court to defer to legislative will and
to the administrative expertise'" of the Department of Education"
145 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 224, 693 A.2d at 456. The court also directed the
Commissioner of Education to study the special extra-educational needs of urban
school children and report on them, to devise programs to meet those needs and to
assess the actual costs of implementing those programs in the urban school districts,
to devise a plan to implement the programs, and to address the facilities needs of
the urban SNDs. See id.; see also News in Brief,NJ. LAw., May 26, 1997, at 2. A week
after its decision, the supreme court appointed appellate division Judge Michael
Patrick King to conduct the court-ordered review. See id.
146 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 226, 698 A.2d at 457.
147 See id. at 197-98, 693 A.2d at 443.

148 See id. at 201-02, 693 A.2d at 445. Conscious of the competing
demands of
separation of powers and the court's obligation to enforce the constitution, the majority wrote:
Our Constitution demands that every child be given an equal opportunity to meet his or her promise....
It is against that backdrop, and the inescapable reality of a continuing profound constitutional deprivation that has penalized generations of children, that one must evaluate an alternative, "wait and
see" approach. That approach usually is both prudent and preferred
in constitutional jurisprudence, and the Court has taken that approach in the past. In light of the constitutional rights at stake, the
persistence and depth of the constitutional deprivation, and in the
absence of any real prospect for genuine educational improvement in
the most needy districts, that approach is no longer an option.
Id. (citations omitted).
149 Id. at 202, 693 A.2d at 445.
IS See id. at 204, 693 A.2d at 446 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting) (noting that "[i]n as-

sessing the constitutionality of CELFA, as with all state legislation, the Court must
presume that it is constitutional").
5 See id. at 211, 693 A.2d at 450 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) (stating, "We
tradi-
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Justice Garibaldi explained that CEIFA represents the first
"comprehensive definition" of the constitution's thorough and efficient education mandate in terms of educational content, not
money.'53 The dissent suggested that CEIFA's content standards
would optimize the chance for children to receive a quality education that makes them productive members of society. 5' The dissenting justice invoked the ancient doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius'54 to explain that the framers of the constitution intended the
T & E Clause to mean adequate education, not equal expenditures
or a uniform education system in the state.'" Justice Garibaldi argued that the majority should allow the Commissioner of Education

tionally defer to administrative determinations on matters implicating the special
knowledge or expertise of [an] administrative agency"). But see Abbott v. Burke,
100 N.J. 269, 298-99, 495 A.2d 376, 392 (1985) (Abbott /) (noting that when constitutional issues are involved, an agency's determinations on those legal issues "do
not receive even a presumption of correctness on appellate review").
152 See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 213, 693 A.2d at 451 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting)
(noting "the Commissioner is in a much better position that the Court to determine the amount of funds needed to support specific programs.").
15 See id. at 205, 693 A.2d at 447 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi
found CEIFA's core curriculum content standards and workplace readiness standards to be a persuasive definition of what is meant by the T & E Clause, noting that
the standards put quality of education ahead of parity of funding. See id. at 220, 693
A.2d at 454 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The justice said educational quality considerations should replace the court's reliance on dollar inputs as the test of a thorough and efficient education. See id.
See id. at 204, 693 A.2d at 446 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that money is not the answer to providing a quality education and that setting content standards is a more effective means of prescribing the educational mandate.
See id. The dissent said, "By emphasizing standards, testing, and strict accountability
of how funds are expended, I believe we can give children in the special needs districts a real opportunity to secure a competitive education. Parity in funding, on
the other hand, has and will continue to provide those children with empty promises." Id.
155See ScAuA, supra note 15, at 25. Scalia explained:
Expression of the one is exclusion of the other. What it means is this:
If you see a sign that says children under twelve may enter free, you
should have no need to ask whether your thirteen-year-old must pay.
The inclusion of the one class is an implicit exclusion of the other.
Id.
1- See Abbott IV, 149 N.J. at 207-08, 693 A.2d at 448 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
The dissent stated: "The words that do not appear in the text are the most compelling evidence of what the Education Clause means." Id. at 207, 693 A.2d at 448
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that other state constitutions include
phrases such as "uniform," "equal opportunities," and "high quality" in defining the
state's educational obligation, while NewJersey's constitution does not contain such
words suggesting a mandate of equivalence or uniformity in education. See id. at
207-08, 693 A.2d at 448 (Garibaldi,J., dissenting).
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a year to attain substantial implementation of CEIFA's corecurriculum standards, rather than invalidate the statute on its face.'"
In applying the T & E Clause, New Jersey courts have, from the
earliest cases, grappled to put flesh on the bare bones of the constitutional provision."" More than a generation ago, the supreme court
concluded that funding levels were "plainly relevant" to an examination of the state's T & E mandate.' 9 In the court's eye, it is clear that
money matters.
There is a critical mass of precedent behind the court's ruling
in Abbott IV After twenty-five years and ten supreme court opinions,
it is virtually inconceivable that the court would abandon its history
of precedent absent exceedingly clear evidence that the court had
been wrong. The doctrine of stare decisis carries too great a
weight.w The evidence offered by the state to support CEIFA, based
as it was on a hypothetical "model" school district and lacking data
from practical study of the issues, falls far short of this level. To
abandon such a line of precedent, as the6 dissent suggests, would be
to sacrifice the court's judicial legitimacy.1 1
SSee id. at 221, 693 A.2d at 455 (Garibaldi,J.,
dissenting).

See Levine v. Institutions & Agencies Dep't of N.J., 84 N.J. 234, 244, 418 A.2d
229, 234 (1980) (noting "[the history of the Constitution's free public education
clause is surprisingly scant").
See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973) (Robinson
15

See Bi.ciCs LAw DICToNARY 978 (6th ed. 1991) (defining stare decisis as the
"[plolicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point"); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). In this decade's definitive
discussion of stare decisis, the Court began the opinion by declaring: "Liberty finds
no refuge in ajurisprudence of doubt." Id. at 844. The Court explained the importance of adhering to precedent unless a prior decision has proven to be unworkable. See id. at 854-55. The opinion stated, "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is, by definition, indispensable." Id.; see also Kathy Barrett Carter, State
Supreme Court Tends Activist Flame: But School Ruling May Not Be a Sign of Future,STARLEDGER, May 19, 1997, at 1. The article, which discusses the Abbott IV opinion and
its ancestry, quotes RonaldJ. Riccio, Dean of Seton Hall University School of Law:
Stare decisis plays a big role. If the court today were writing on a clean
slate it might not come out the same way.... This is an issue that has
a long history before the court and it's bound to follow at least the
general principles articulated in earlier decisions.
Id.
1
See Abbott l, 149 N.J. at 207, 693 A.2d at 448. Despite the extensive precedent
devoted to interpreting the T & E Clause, the dissent rejects the findings in the Robinson and Abbott cases, favoring a "plain meaning" analysis instead. See id.; see also
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-65. As the Supreme Court noted in Casey, the Court could
pay the "terrible price" of losing its institutional integrity through discarding prior
case law upon which society has come to rely. See id. The Court explained:
160
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It is undisputed that NewJersey's schools are not uniformly succeeding in delivering the constitutional standard of a thorough and
efficient education, especially in the urban school districts. 62 As the
court has pointed out, the state is constitutionally---"squarely and
completely"-responsible for this failure.'6 While local control in
education may have attractive advantages, it was not the norm at the
time the T & E Clause was written and can hardly be read into the
constitution.'" The constitution does, however, hold the state responsible for assuring a thorough and efficient education for all students. The state is not meeting this mandate.
When a governmental body fails to meet its constitutional obligations, the courts are not only empowered, but are obligated to act.
The interests of the state's children are best served by ajudiciary that
takes seriously its duty to assure that the constitutional mandate is
met. Judicial review has been a part of NewJersey's history since the
Revolutionary War, 56 and the court in Abbott IV rightly adhered to
that tradition. Any "activism" by the court came grudgingly. After
twenty-five years, ten supreme court opinions, and repeated deference to the legislature, the court can hardly be called a usurper of
the legislative role by ordering a remedy. The court is, quite simply,
doing what it must to preserve judicial legitimacy and to defend the
constitution.
As Americans of each succeeding generation are told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a
minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to
declare what it demands.
Id. at 865.
162 SeeAbbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 394, 575 A.2d 359, 412 (1990)
(Abbott 11).
After an extensive discussion, the court concluded:
After all the analyses are completed, we are still left with these students and their lives. They are not being educated. Our Constitution
says they must be.... The record proves what all suspect: that if the
children of poor districts went to school today in richer ones, educationally they would be better off. Everything in this record confirms
what we know- they need that advantage much more than the other
children. And what everyone knows is that-as children-the only
reason they do not get that advantage is that they were born in a poor
district.
Id.
16,
See Abbott v. Burke, 136 N.J. 445, 455, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (1994) (Abbott IMI).
The court pointed out: "It is the State and only the State that is responsible for this
educational disparity, and only the State can correct it." Id. at 454, 643 A.2d at 580.
16 See Robinson 1, 62 N.J. at 507, 303 A.2d at 291.
165 See WnIAMs, supra note 14, at 4.
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Judicial action of this type inevitably begs the question: Where
does it end? The court makes no prediction of how or when it will
remove itself from the education business. However, one thing is
clear-Abbott IV leaves the court squarely involved in achieving funding parity and eventually implementing an education funding bill
that can pass constitutional muster."M

N See Abby Goodnough, Rural Schools Feel Ignored by Trenton Aid to Poor, N.Y.
TIM, June 23, 1997, at Al, B2 (reporting that property-poor rural school districts,
which were not included in Abbott 11s funding remedy, plan to sue the state for an
increase in aid); see also Abby Goodnough, Whitman Vows She71 Track Schools' Use of
Extra Money, N.Y. TiMES, May 28, 1997, at B7 (noting that the Department of Education would begin conducting studies to identify strong education programs that
work and efficient spending practices, in an effort to prove that money alone is not
the answer).
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Given the long history of precedent, the continuing constitutional violation, and the state's repeated failure to correct constitutional deficiencies, it is understandable that the court seemed impatient in ordering relief in Abbott IV"" The court was courageous in
refusing to allow a generation-old constitutional violation to persist,
especially one impacting our most vulnerable citizens.'"
James C. Shel

161

SeeAbbottv. Burke, 149 N.J. 145, 197-98, 693 A.2d 417, 443 (Abbott M). The

court noted that the legislature had seven years to comply with the court's directive
in Abbott IIby the 1997-98 school year and has failed to implement a plan to assure
parity of funding, as ordered by the court. See id. In light of the continuing constitutional violation and the state's repeated failure to meet the court's mandate, the
majority said, "Thus the remedy of increased funding for educational improvement
in the poor urban districts should not be delayed any further." Id. The Court concluded, "There can be no responsible dissent from the position that the Court has
the constitutional obligation to do what it can to effectuate and vindicate the constitutional rights of the school children in the poverty-stricken urban school districts."
Id. at 202, 693 A.2d at 445; see also Carter, supra note 160, at 1. The author contrasts
the majority's opinion in Abbott IV with the late Chief Justice Wilentz's opinion in
Abbott II, calling the latter 'thunderclap stuff" that was "part legal decision, part social treatise." Id. Of the post-Wilentz majority in Abbott IV, the author noted, "the
justices have never been tougher.... It was not a flowery decision. It was, some
might say, the 'Just-Do-It Decision.'" Id. The newspaper quotes Paul Tractenberg,
plaintiffs' attorney in the Abbott cases, describing the opinion as "the strongest decision in the history of this litigation, starting with Robinson v. Cahill right up to Abbottv. Burke." Id.
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Rudy Larini, Abbott Faults Choices More Than Schools: Inmate Was Namesake
Plaintiffin Historic Case, STAR-LEDGER, May 18, 1997, at 1. Former Camden student
Raymond Arthur Abbott, the plaintiff whose name has been tied to the education
funding challenge for sixteen years, is now serving a four to eight year burglary sentence at the Watertown, New York, Correctional Facility, his latest of several incarcerations. See id. Abbott dropped out of high school and became addicted to crack
cocaine. See id. The article quotes Abbott, reflecting on the case: "I also wished,
and this was my mother's dream before she passed away, that the government would
give more money to schools so kids could have a fair chance." Id. Of the lawsuit
bearing his name, Abbott said it only became important to him when he had a
daughter, noting, "I don't want her to grow up like I grew up. I want her and other
kids to get the education they need.... [They] don't want to turn out like I did."
Id.

